We investigate Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a stateowned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm searching to maximize its own profit, compete. First, we establish the existence and uniqueness results for the Cournot scheme, and propose the agents' classification as strong or weak according to the agent's optimal reaction function properties at the Cournot equilibrium. Then we examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms in the Stackelberg schemes and compare the profits and domestic social surplus and the production volumes at each type of Stackelberg equilibrium.
Introduction
Examinations of mixed oligopolies, in which social surplus-maximizing public firms compete against profit-maximizing private firms, have become increasingly popular in recent years. For pioneering works on mixed oligopolies, see [1, 2, 4, 11] . Excellent surveys can be found in [3, 12, 14] .
The interest in mixed oligopolies is high because of their importance in the economies of Europe (Germany, England and others), Canada and Japan (see [10] for analysis of 'herd behaviour' by private firms in many branches of the economy in Japan). There are examples of mixed oligopolies in United States such as the packaging and overnight delivery industries. Mixed oligopolies are also common in the East European and former Soviet Union transitional economies, in which competition among public and private firms existed or still exists in many industries such as banking, house loan, airlines, telecommunication, natural gas, electric power, hospital, health care, railways and others.
These situations have been investigated in different ways. Many works analysed Cournot and Stackelberg models with the role of each firm assigned exogenously. However, it is reasonable to assume that each firm decides what actions to take, and when to take them.
DeFraja and Delbono [3] are pioneers in these investigations. They showed that in simultaneous-move games, privatization of the public firm may improve welfare. In [9] it is shown that under certain conditions, the partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare. Pal [13] found that the public firm can be follower, but he assumed that private firms are domestic.
In the paper by Matsumura [8] , the author investigates mixed duopoly and analyses a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm, when the inverse demand function is concave. Under these conditions, Matsumura found that the role of the public firm should be that of the leader (however, the author makes assumptions about the concavity of domestic social surplus and profit function with respect to the volumes of the domestic public firm and private foreign firm, respectively). Matsumura also establishes that domestic social surplus in a mixed duopoly is greater than in a monopolistic market.
In this article, we also examine the desirable roles of both the foreign private agent and the domestic public firm. In contrast to [8] , here we do not require the inverse demand function to be concave. Hence the model describes more general situations, and the role of firms in the observable delay game could be either leader or follower.
An extended abstract of this work was published in the Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Innovative Computing, Information and Control (ICICIC'2007), Kumamoto, Japan, September 05-07, 2007 (cf [7] ).
The article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the model and establish existence and uniqueness theorems for the Cournot equilibrium. After analysing the agents' optimal response functions at the Cournot equilibrium, we define the concept of a strong firm and a weak firm. Section 3 deals with the game where the domestic public firm is the leader and the private foreign firm is the follower. Section 4 considers the game where the domestic public firm is the follower and the private foreign firm is the leader. The domestic public firm may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium, and as a consequence this firm could be weak or strong. Finally, in Section 5, we make comparisons between the domestic social surplus quantities and the private firm's profits at various Stackelberg and Cournot equilibrium states, and we examine the observable delay game when the private firm is strong and when it is weak.
Due to the volume restrictions, we omit certain lengthy proofs, which will appear elsewhere.
Model specification
Consider two firms producing a homogeneous product. Let G represent the total output, and p(G) denote an inverse demand function, i.e. the price of a unit of the product. The goods produced by the two firms are sold on the domestic market. Let q i , i ¼ 1,2, denote the output of firm i. Let c i (q i ) stand for the production cost by firm i. As G is the total output, one has
ð2:1Þ
Firm 1 is a foreign private firm, which maximizes its own profits, and firm 2 is a domestic public firm that maximizes domestic social surplus. Domestic social surplus S is the sum of consumer surplus and profits of firm 2, and is given by
here of course,
The profit of firm 1 is given by:
We also want to solve an observable delay game. This game consists of three stages. At the first stage, each firm i, i ¼ 1, 2 independently chooses e i 2 {2, 3}, i ¼ 1, 2, where e i indicates when to produce the output q i . Namely, e i ¼ 2 implies that firm i produces at the second stage, and e i ¼ 3 means that firm i produces at the third stage. In the end of the first stage, each firm select its e i 2 (2, 3). At the second stage, each firm i choosing e i ¼ 2 assigns its output q i . At the third stage, each firm i choosing e i ¼ 3 selects its output q i . In the end of the game, the market opens and each firm i sells its output. This is a complete information game, i.e. each firm knows the rival's choice at the first stage. We accept the following assumptions concerning the inverse demand function and cost functions:
A1. Let p(G) ! 0 be a twice continuously differentiable function defined over G 4 0, with p 0 ðGÞ 5 0 and p(G)G being a strictly concave function. Moreover, we assume that
A2. We assume that the cost functions c i (q i ), i ¼ 1, 2, are twice continuously differentiable, non-decreasing and convex, with non-negative values defined over q i ! 0 (i.e. c i (q i ) ! 0).
A3. For i ¼ 1, there exists an H 1 4 0, such that:
whereas for i ¼ 2, there exists an H 2 4 0, such that:
A4. Principle of potential participation 
of assumption A3 yields that there exists an H 3 4 0 such that
ð2:6Þ
To make it possible to define an equilibrium with only first-order optimality conditions, we first have to verify that the profit and/or domestic social surplus functions are concave over their domains. We do that by establishing the following auxiliary results given without proof that will appear elsewhere. Proof The existence of solutions to problems (2.7)-(2.9) follows from the next result. This Cournot equilibrium problem is a standard complementarity problem and can be rewritten in the following form: Find a vector x 2 R 2 such that:
As it follows from assumption A1, the mapping F : R is valid for at least one of the indices i ¼ 1, . . . , n. Then problem (2.10) has a solution, and all the solutions belong to C.
Coming back to the proof of Theorem 2.3, select a (non-empty) subset
with H 3 defined in Remark 2.3 (see inequality (2.6)). Now we prove that inequality (2.12) holds for at least one index at any point x outside the subset C. Consider an arbitrary x = 2 C, that is, at least one of the following conditions is valid:
In this case, according to assumptions A1-A4, we get the inequality
Now recall that
which, together with (2.14), immediately implies that F 1 (x) 4 0, hence
Inequality (2.15) implies formula (2.12) in case (i). (ii) Assume that 0 q 1 H 1 , but q 2 4 H 3 . In that case, by assumptions A1-A4, the following inequality holds:
Let us examine the component F 2 (x): 
Thus, the last inequality implies x 2 F 2 (x) ¼ q 2 F 2 (x) 4 0, that is, (2.12) is valid for any x = 2 C in case (ii), too. Therefore, to complete the proof of Theorem 2.3, it suffices to apply Theorem 6.8. g Now we turn to examining uniqueness properties of the Cournot equilibrium defined by (2.7)-(2.9). First we engage in determining the uniqueness of a non-monopolistic equilibrium volume. To do that, we need to involve an extra assumption concerning the inverse demand function p.
be an equilibrium, i.e. a solution of the Cournot problem (2.7)-(2.9). We say that this equilibrium is non-monopolistic if
A5. Assume that the product p 0 ðGÞG is a non-decreasing function over G 4 0.
Remark 2.5 Assumption A5 implies that the inverse demand function's decrease rate is not too high (in other words, the negative slope p 0 ðGÞ is 'not too negative'). Moreover, it is clear that assumption A5 is equivalent to the condition
which, together with assumption A1, implies the convexity of the inverse demand function p.
THEOREM 2.4 (Theorem of Uniqueness)
Under assumptions A1, A2 and A5, the cleared market quantity G is the same at each non-monopolistic equilibrium.
Remark 2.6 When the equilibrium is non-monopolistic, then according to Theorem 2.4, the cleared market volume G is determined uniquely. However, in some cases both monopolistic and non-monopolistic equilibrium states with distinct volumes can occur. For instance, that may happen if the cost functions c i and the product p(G)G are piece-wise linear functions.
We finish this section with a result guaranteeing the uniqueness of not only the equilibrium cleared market volume G but also the complete equilibrium state
COROLLARY 2.5 Under assumptions A1-A5, the equilibrium state Z exists uniquely.
Proof First, under assumptions A1-A4, there are equilibrium states. Moreover, as assumption A4 implies, no agent can have zero production volume, hence all the equilibrium states are non-monopolistic. Therefore, Theorem 2.4 implies that the equilibrium cleared market volume G is unique. Now suppose that for the same volume G, there exist two distinct pairs ½q 
which implies an impossible inequality 0 5 0. This contradiction completes the proof of the uniqueness of the equilibrium contribution by the foreign agent q 1 . Finally, the balance equality (2.18) guarantees the uniqueness of the domestic firm's equilibrium production volume q 2 as well. g
Stackelberg model with leadership of domestic (public) firm
First, in this section, we examine the game where firm 2 (the public one) is the leader. Firm 2 chooses its output volume q 2 , and firm 1 (the private one) chooses q 1 after having observed q 2 , so as to maximize its net profit:
Let q 1 ¼ q 1 (q 2 ) ! 0 be the (optimal) reaction function of firm 1; that is, the value that satisfies the equality
By convexity of the cost function c 1 and by assumption A3, this reaction function is well defined. Indeed, if pðGÞ 4 c 0 1 ð0Þ then one can obtain q 1 (q 2 ) by solving the first-order optimality condition:
otherwise, i.e. if pðGÞ c 0 1 ð0Þ, then q 1 (q 2 ) ¼ 0. In other words, 
The denominator in (3.6) is always positive: indeed, c 
which again yields the strict positivity of the denominator in (3.6). Therefore, (3.6) implies
Now we introduce the following classification of agents, according to their optimal reaction function's properties at the Cournot equilibrium. Such a classification was considered first in [6] and can be also found in the book by Isac, Bulavsky and Kalashnikov [5] . To do that, we denote the (unique) solution of the Cournot game (2.7)-(2.9) total volume by G C . 
which, together with relationship (3.8), completes the proof. g
Now firm 2 (domestic producer) chooses q 2 Q ! 0 so as to maximize
where
First, we examine some basic properties of the domestic social surplus function S 2 (Q). Definition (3.13) implies that if the valueq 2 4 0 is finite, then
Hence, the function G ¼ G(Q) is differentiable at every point Q 6 ¼q 2 , with At the point Q ¼q 2 , the function G(Q) may have only one-side derivatives:
Furthermore, since q 0 1 ðQÞ ¼ 0 for Q 4q 2 , (3.17) implies that
Optimization 697
Now differentiating the domestic social surplus function (3.12) with respect to Q and using the relationship (3.15), one gets for Q 6 ¼q 2
ð3:19Þ
In a similar manner we obtain the formulas for the one-side derivatives of the domestic social surplus at the point Q ¼q 2 when it is finite:
ð Þ: ð3:20Þ
As the one-side derivatives are equal, we can conclude that domestic social surplus is differentiable at the point Q ¼q 2 as well, with
Now we are in a position to recall a mathematically rigorous definition of the Stackelberg equilibrium state with the domestic leader and foreign follower.
Definition 3.2 A Stackelberg equilibrium (with the domestic firm as a leader and the foreign firm as a follower) is the vector
Next we establish relationships to compare the production volumes of the firms at the Stackelberg equilibrium state (3.22)-(3.24) to those at the Cournot equilibrium defined by the complementarity problem (2.7)-(2.9). Besides, it is interesting to compare the values Q C and Q L to the domestic firm's optimum output volume Q P at the perfect competition equilibrium, that is, when the domestic producer ignores the price variation and solves the following complementarity problem: Find a Q ! 0 such that
The proof is omitted due to the paper volume restrictions. THEOREM 3.2 Under assumptions A1-A4, the following estimates hold: 
ð3:32Þ
Note that the estimates obtained in Theorem 2.2 and Remark 3.3 involve the expressions minfQ C , Q L g and maxfQ C , Q L g, because assumptions A1-A4 in general do not imply the (strict) concavity of the leader's (domestic social surplus) function S 2 (Q) over all Q ! 0. Now we introduce an additional assumption which allows one to establish this concavity of the domestic social surplus function and hence deduce more exact global comparative static results making use of some local information only.
A6. Assume that the foreign firm's cost function is linear:
where c 1 4 0 is a constant, and the inverse demand function has the following property: the ratio
is a differentiable function of G 4 0, and the following estimate holds: Being too long, we omit the proof of the above result, to be published elsewhere. Now we can obtain the complete comparative static classification for the Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium states under assumptions A1-A4 and A6.
Optimization 699 THEOREM 3.4 Under assumptions A1-A4 and A6, and with the leadership of the domestic supplier, the following global estimates based upon the local information are true:
Proof Due to relationships (3.5), (3.11) 
The theorem has been proved completely. g Hence, under assumptions A1-A4 and A6, equality (3.38) can be solved for the parameter valueq 2 as follows:q
Remark 3.6 Cases (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 3.4 allow the following interpretation. Although the total domestic surplus is always higher if the domestic producer is a leader, because
by definitions (3.22)-(3.24), it is interesting to note that the total market cleared volume in the Stackelberg scenario grows compared to that in the Cournot equilibrium only if the foreign producer is a strong firm. Indeed, case (ii) with G 0 ðQ C Þ 4 1 means that
On the contrary, if q 0 1 ðQ C Þ 5 0, that is, when the foreign participant is weak, one comes to
Therefore, for an individual consumer concerned with the good's retail price, it would be better if the domestic producer as a leader of the market were accompanied by a strong foreign competitor as a follower.
Stackelberg model with leadership of foreign (private) firm
Now consider the game where firm 1 (foreign private firm) is a leader. Firm 1 chooses q 1 and firm 2 (domestic or public supplier) chooses q 2 after having observed q 1 , so as to maximize domestic social surplus:
Let q 2 (q 1 ) be the reaction function of firm 2; that is, the quantity that satisfies the optimality condition below:
This reaction function is well defined due to convexity of the cost function c 2 and assumption A3. Moreover, assumptions A2 and A4 imply that if q 1 ¼ 0 then the reaction value of firm 2 solving the equation
is always positive but not exceeding the upper bound H 2 from assumption A3. Otherwise, if q 1 4 0, then the reaction value of firm 2 solves the complementarity problem (2.9):
and again, it is strictly positive and not exceeding H 2 . This means that q 2 ¼ q 2 (q 1 ) 4 0 is the unique solution of the equation
Now taking into account (4.2) and differentiating the obtained equation with respect to q 1 one gets:
The denominator in ratio (4.7) is always negative. Indeed, À c 00 2 (q 2 (q 1 )) 0 due to assumption A2; next, if p 00 (G) ! 0, then p 0 ðGÞ À q 1 p 00 ðGÞ 5 0 by assumption A1 as p 0 ðGÞ 5 0; finally, if p 00 (G) 5 0, one yields the chain of inequalities
by (2.4) in assumption A1. Therefore, we conclude that
Remark 4.1 Formula (4.8) has an interesting economic interpretation: the domestic producer (firm 2) is always weak if the inverse demand function is convex, and is always strong if the latter is concave.
Now firm 1 (foreign producer) selects a q 1 Q ! 0 so as to maximize its profit function
By differentiating (4.10) with respect to Q one gets
Now differentiating the foreign firm's profit (4.9) by Q one yields 
In what follows we establish relationships which allow one to compare the production volumes of the cleared market at the Stackelberg equilibrium (4.13)-(4.15) to those at the Cournot equilibrium defined with the complementarity problem (2.7)-(2.9). Besides, it is instructive to compare the values Q C 1 and Q L 1 to the foreign firm's optimum output Q P 1 in the perfect competition equilibrium, that is, when the foreign (private) producer ignores variations in price and solves the following complementarity problem: Find a Q 1 ! 0 such that First of all, we note that Q L 1 solves the following complementarity problem: Find a Q 1 ! 0 such that
while Q C 1 is a solution to the complementarity problem (2.8): Find a Q 1 ! 0 such that
Finally, recall that Q F 1 solves the following complementarity problem: Find a Q 1 ! 0 such that
ð4:23Þ THEOREM 4.1 Under assumptions A1-A4, with a strictly convex cost function c 1 and a convex inverse demand function p, the following relationships are valid:
Otherwise, if the function p is concave, we have the inequalities below:
As the proof of the above theorem is quite lengthy, we omit it to publish later elsewhere.
Remark 4.3 If we assume that G 0 ðQ 1 Þ 4 0 (which, e.g., is guaranteed if p is concave, cf (4.8) and (4.11), but not only in this case) we can make interesting conclusions concerning the cleared market volume in different scenarios. On the one hand, when p 00 ! 0, inequalities (4.24) imply the relationships
These relationships mean that when the domestic producer is weak, the leadership of the private firm is better for the individual consumer than the Cournot competition between 
which clearly indicate that if the domestic producer is strong, then the leadership of the private firm may lower the total market volume against the Cournot equilibrium and hence raise the good's retail price on the market.
Solution of observable delay game
Now denote the domestic social surplus optimal values and the foreign firm's profits at the various forms of equilibrium as follows: As to the comparison between values of S C and S F , we establish the following result (the proof will be presented elsewhere). The next result compares the values of P C and P F . Again, the proof is omitted due to the volume restrictions. LEMMA 5.2 Under assumptions A1-A4 and A6, the following relationships are true: On the other hand, if the inverse demand function p is concave, and hence we have a strong public firm and a weak private firm, only one case is possible:
(iii) As G 0 ðQ C 2 þ 0Þ 5 1, then there is only one Nash equilibrium in the observable delay game: e* ¼ (3, 2) , which means that the public firm is a leader and the private firm is a follower.
Conclusion
In the presented analysis, we investigated three different types of equilibria in the duopoly with a private (foreign) agent aiming at maximization of its own profit, and a domestic firm maximizing domestic social surplus. After having obtained the existence and uniqueness results for the Cournot equilibrium in the above-described model, we examined two versions of Stackelberg game, with the private firm as a leader and domestic one as a follower, and vice versa.
In order to compare the equilibrium volumes in various scenarios we introduce the concepts of a weak and a strong firm, in dependence on the sign of the agent's optimal reaction function's derivative at the Cournot equilibrium. With such a characteristic, it turns out that if the inverse demand function is convex, then the domestic producer is always weak, and vice versa: if the inverse demand function is concave, then the domestic agent is always strong.
For the Stackelberg equilibrium with the domestic producer as a leader, we obtain that the production volume by the leader (and hence, the total cleared market volume) is higher than that in the Cournot equilibrium, if the private firm (the follower) is strong. Otherwise, if the private agent is weak, then the total cleared market volume is lower with the domestic producer as a leader than that would be in the Cournot equilibrium.
Next, if the foreign (private) firm is a leader, then the relations between the leader's (and hence, the total) production volumes directly depend upon the strength of the domestic producer as a follower: if the domestic producer is weak, then the leader's production volume is higher than that would be in the Cournot equilibrium; otherwise, when the domestic firm is strong, the private leader's output (and hence the total cleared market volume) is lower than that in the Cournot equilibrium.
Comparing the corresponding values of the agents' objective functions (the profit function for the private firm, and domestic social surplus for the public firm), we find that in the observable delay game with the two participants, the number of Nash equilibrium states depends upon their relative efficiency. Namely, if the private firm is strong and the domestic producer is weak, then only one Nash equilibrium exists in the observable delay game, and that is the Stackelberg equilibrium with the private firm as a leader. Next, if both the foreign (private) and the domestic (public) agents are weak, then two Optimization 705 Nash equilibrium states occur: one is the same as just mentioned, and another one with the roles interchanged: the domestic agent being a leader and the foreign firm being a follower. Finally, when the domestic producer is strong and the foreign one is weak, again only one Nash equilibrium in the observable delay game exists, and it is the Stackelberg equilibrium with the domestic (public) producer as a leader and the foreign (private) firm as a follower.
